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Greetings and Grievances: 
A Letter from Afghan Professors 
 
Laurel Currie Oates* 
 
On that first day, all of us were wary. Although I had taught in 
Afghanistan on two prior occasions, this was the first time some of my 
“students” were professors who taught Shariah1 law at the country’s two 
most conservative universities: the University of Nangarhar, which is in the 
eastern part of Afghanistan, and the University of Kandahar, which is in the 
south.2 Wearing traditional clothing and beards, the professors who sat in 
front of me looked very much like the “insurgents” so often featured on my 
evening newscasts. I, on the other hand was a woman, albeit an older 
woman, from the United States.3 
                                                                                                                              
*  Laurel Currie Oates is a Professor of Law at Seattle University School of Law. I would 
like to thank Patti McLaughlin, Mark Hough, Michael Oates, Anne Enquist, and Mimi 
Samuel for reading earlier drafts of this article.  In addition, I would like to thank my 
research assistant, Lorie Hahn, for her valuable assistance. 
1 Many of the words used in this article can be spelled in more than one way.  For 
example, “Shariah” is also sometimes spelled “Sharia.” CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES 
ONLINE, Sharia, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/sharia?q=shariah (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2013). 
2   The University of Nangarhar, which is located in Jalalabad, was established in 1963.  
NANGARHAR UNIVERSITY, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG., History, 
http://nu.edu.af/en/page/891 (lasted visited July 22, 2013). The Shariah faculty 
(department) was established in 1992; it currently has 686 students, 625 of whom are 
men and 61 of whom are women.  See NANGARHAR UNIVERSITY, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 
AFG., Faculty of Sharia, http://nu.edu.af/en/page/5097 (last visited June 27, 2013); 
NANGARHAR UNIVERSITY, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG., History 
http://nu.edu.af/en/page/891 (last visited June 27, 2013).  The University of Kandahar, 
which is located in Kandahar City, was established in 1990. The Shariah faculty was 
established in 2008. See id. 
3 When I am in Afghanistan, I dress conservatively, wearing a long skirt or pants and a 
tunic. In addition, I wear a scarf. In the summer months, sandals seem to be just fine. 
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All went well in that first class, and the professors and I spent the next 
three weeks together; me helping them improve their English4 by teaching 
short courses in US Criminal Law, Contract Law, and Family Law, and 
them teaching me about Shariah law and Afghan culture. While language 
and cultural barriers kept us from doing some of the things I might do with 
American professors, for example, going out for dinner, we became 
comfortable enough with each other that we could have lively 
conversations, both inside and outside of the classroom, about education, 
families, religion, and politics. 
Consequently, on that last day, it seemed natural for me to ask the 
professors what they would like me to tell my students and the other 
members of my faculty about Afghanistan. After a short conversation 
among themselves, most of it in English, but some of it in Pashto,5 the 
professors announced they wanted to draft a letter to US law professors. 
The following letter is the product of the work session that followed in 
which the professors dictated and I typed.  When I was not sure that I 
understood the point the professors were making, I asked for clarification 
and, at the end, we edited the letter, correcting most of the problems with 
sentence construction, grammar and punctuation, and usage.  The contents 
of that letter are set out below. 
Greetings to the professors in America: 
We hope that the professors in America will take an active role in 
making suggestions that will help solve the world’s problems. 
We are all humans, no matter whether we are Muslim or Christian. 
                                                                                                                              
4 The professors who drafted the letter had studied English for several years and had 
reasonably good conversational skills. While a few of the professors were younger, my 
best guess is that most of them were in their 40s of 50s, which means that they were 
adults during the Soviet occupation. 
5 Afghanistan has two official languages: Afghan Persian, which is called Dari, and 
Pashto. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library 
/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (lastvisited June 27, 2013). 
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All American law professors should learn Islamic law, and they 
should learn about it from Islamic scholars. 
America wants democracy all over the world. However, America 
does not honor the votes of the people and supports governments 
that are not the governments the voters want. For example, 
America supported Mubarak in Egypt. 
Most of the problems are created by the fact that America treats 
people differently, applying one policy to one group and a different 
policy to another group. For example, America has helped 
Southern Sudan where most of the people are Christian. However, 
America does not support the people of Palestine. 
Sometimes American soldiers in Afghanistan treat the people not 
as humans, but as animals. For example, soldiers enter Afghani 
homes without permission and they capture people and keep them 
in jail without any court proceedings. Although they say they 
believe in the rule of law, American soldiers do not follow their 
own laws or Afghan law. 
We don’t know who the terrorists are. Are the terrorists the 
Americans or the Taliban? 
The American government wants to solve problems in Islamic 
regions through military means, which is not appropriate. Islamic 
law is from God and there are specific rules. We do not understand 
why America does not want us to apply Islamic law. Western law 
is for rich countries. Poor countries cannot apply Western law, but 
they can apply Islamic law. 
There would be no need for fighting if areas could establish their 
own Islamic governments. 
Americans dismiss Afghanistan’s family law. They broadcast TV 
programs that show families living in ways that are not the way 
that we live in Afghanistan. 
If an Israeli is killed, the killing receives lots of international 
attention. If a Palestinian is killed, there is only silence. 
It is good that the American troops will be leaving. 
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Like many Afghans, some Americans are corrupt. They send aid, 
but they demand money before they will help your district with its 
projects. 
Many of Afghanistan’s government ministers work for (on behalf 
of) foreign countries and not on behalf of the Afghan people. 
America has put lots of money into Afghanistan, but not enough 
into infrastructure.  Aid money should be used to build dams that 
create electric power, to help build factories, and to support local 
businesses. 
We hope that American law professors will share our concerns 
with those in the American government.6 
Over the last couple of months, I have asked myself why I feel such a 
strong desire to publish this letter. The easy answer is that I told the 
professors that I would share it. Although I could have accomplished that 
goal by attaching the letter to an email addressed to my own faculty, it 
seems, however, that the letter deserves a wider distribution and an even 
broader critique. 
The letter deserves a wider distribution because, although stories about 
Afghanistan often dominate the news, we almost never hear from those in 
Afghanistan who are among the most conservative. We hear about them, 
but not from them. However, this group has tremendous influence, and 
there is a good chance that their influence will determine what happens in 
Afghanistan in the next decade. 
The letter also provides an opportunity to critique the United States’ role 
in Afghanistan. No one would disagree that the costs have been high. 
Between 2001 and 2011, more than two million Americans served in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, with almost half of those individuals serving more than one 
tour of duty.7 In addition, since the United States invaded Afghanistan in 
                                                                                                                              
6  Letter from Afghanistan Professors to American Professors (2013) (on file with 
author). 
7 Luis Martinez & Amy Bingham, U.S. Veterans: By the Numbers, ABC NEWS (Nov. 
11, 2011) http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-veterans-numbers/story?id=14928136#1. 
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late 2001, more than 2,200 Americans have lost their lives and more than 
18,000 have been injured in hostile actions.8 The financial costs have also 
been high. During that same time period, the United States spent $444 
billion on military-related expenses and $89 billion in aid.9 These numbers 
do not take into account the costs to Afghans. While it is difficult to find 
accurate numbers, sources indicate that between 2001 and 2011, 12,500 to 
14,700 Afghan civilians were killed.10 And deaths are on the rise. 
According to a United Nations report released on June 11, 2013, 3,092 
Afghan civilians were killed or injured in the first half of 2013.11   Many of 
those were Afghan children.12 
The benefits are much harder to measure. On the one hand, much of 
Kabul has been rebuilt; many who fled Afghanistan have returned, and 
more boys—and girls—are in school.  On the other hand, Afghanistan is 
still not a safe place. Thus, while I do not share many of the professors’ 
beliefs, I am not comfortable simply dismissing their concerns. During our 
classes, the professors listened to me with respect and curiosity; they 
seemed genuinely interested in learning about the United States and, in 
particular, about our system of law. As a result, I left Afghanistan believing 
                                                                                                                              
8 The Associated Press, US Military Deaths in Afghanistan at 2,103, ABC NEWS (June 
18, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/us-military-deaths-afghanistan-
2103-19431162#.Ucj8xzSmjps. 
9 See Amy Belasco, Cong. Research Serv., The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other 
Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 *1 (Mar. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. 
10 NETA C. CRAWFORD, CIVILIAN DEATH AND INJURY IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2011, 1 
(2011), available at http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/CrawfordAfghanistan 
Casualties.pdf. 
11 Sharon Behn, UN: More Than 3,000 Afghan Civilians Killed and Wounded in the First 
Five Months, One-Fifth of Them Children, RAWA NEWS (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2013/06/11/un-more-than-3-000-afghan-civilians-
killed-and-wounded-in-the-first-five-months-one-fifth-of-them-children.html; UNITED 
NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG.; UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN 
AFGHANISTAN, http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&amp;ctl=Details 
&amp;mid=15756&amp;ItemID=36944&amp;language=en-US (last visited July 13, 
2013). 
12 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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that I owed it to these professors to learn more about their history, their 
religion, and their legal system. 
This article describes some of what I have learned. Because history tends 
to repeat itself, Part I of this article summarizes Afghanistan’s modern 
history. Part II then looks at Afghanistan since 2001. In this section, I 
discuss the man the United States went into Afghanistan to kill, Osama bin 
Laden; the Bonn Agreement; Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution; 
Afghanistan’s judicial systems; and some of the rule of law projects. In Part 
III, I move to a discussion of the Ulema, or clergy, and in particular the 
National Ulema Council and its recent declarations. Finally, in Part IV, I 
reflect on my personal responses to these professors’ statements, reflect on 
what I might have done differently, and formulate some predictions for 
future interactions. 
I.  A SHORT HISTORY 
Because Afghanistan’s history is long, I begin with modern events and, 
out of necessity, describe those events in a way that is simultaneously 
selective and very general. I start with two points made by the Afghan 
professors: first, that Afghanistan was never colonized and, second, that 
Afghanistan has always defeated those who have tried to control it.13 
The first decades of the 1800s were marked by both internal and external 
conflicts. Internally, different families, and even members within those 
families, fought for control of the country.14 For example, members of the 
Sadozai family ruled from 1747 until 1823, and members of the Barakzai 
family15 ruled off and on for much of the next 100 years. Externally, the 
Afghanistan state was targeted by the Sikhs who had taken the last of 
                                                                                                                              
13 For a more complete history of Afghanistan, see THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHANISTAN: 
A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY (2011); See also SHAISTA WAHAB & BARRY 
YOUNGERMAN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN (Infobase Pub. 2007). 
14 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 71–82. See also BARFIELD, supra note 13, 
at 110–14. 
15 Id. 
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Afghanistan’s Indian provinces and appeared ready to move west, by the 
Russians who had reached Afghanistan’s western border and supported the 
Persian campaign to take Herat, and by the British who had sent envoys to 
establish relationships that would allow it to use Afghanistan as a buffer 
between India, over which it had established control, and Russia.16 
The First Anglo-Afghan War lasted from 1839 until 1841.17 In 1838, 
Lord Auckland, India’s Governor General, issued the Simla Manifesto in 
which he set out the reasons why the British needed a trustworthy ally in 
Afghanistan to protect British interests in India from Russia.18 Although 
many in both Britain and India thought Auckland’s decision to invade 
Afghanistan was rash and unnecessary,19 the Army of the Indus, made up of 
both British and Indian units, attacked Afghanistan in 1839. After the 
surrender of Dost Muhammad Khan, a member of the Barakzai family, the 
British installed Shah Shuja, a member of the Sadozai family, as the head of 
the  country.20 
However, Shah Shuja did not enjoy as much popular support as the 
British had hoped, and it soon became apparent the British would need to 
keep a force in Afghanistan if it wanted to maintain control.21 Afghan 
resistance and attacks increased as families of British and Indian soldiers 
began to move in. Afghanis objected to the presence of “infidels” 
(Christians and Hindus) in their country, and bloody uprisings became 
common.22 What followed has become part of Afghan’s folklore. Unwilling 
to wait for an armed escort out of the country, in January of 1842 General 
Elphinstone led 4,500 troops and 12,000 civilians and camp followers east 
                                                                                                                              
16 BARFIELD, supra note 13, at 111. 
17 Id. at 115–24. 
18 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 82–83. See also Wahid Momand, Anglo 
Afghan War 1, AFGHANLAND http://www.afghanland.com/history/anglo1.html (last 
visited July 13, 2013). 
19 Some labeled the war “Aukland’s Folly.” Momand, supra note 18. 
20 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 74–84. 
21 Id. at 84. 
22 Id. 
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into the mountains.23 Almost 14,000 died of starvation or hypothermia or 
were killed.24 
The Second Anglo-Afghan War lasted from 1878 until 1880.25 Once 
again, worried about Russian interference in India, the British invaded 
Afghanistan and installed a leader of their choosing.26 The first phase of the 
war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Gandamak, which permitted 
Afghanistan to retain sovereignty over its internal affairs but gave the 
British control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy.27 However, when Afghan 
forces did not get paid, riots broke out and the head of the newly established 
British mission, Sir Louis Cavagnari, was killed along with his guards.28 
The British retaliated, killing those Afghans thought to be involved in 
imposing direct rule.29 
A large number of Afghans from diverse tribes and ethnic groups 
responded.30 Although the Afghans did not beat the British in open battle, 
they were enough of a threat that the British, remembering what had 
happened at the end of the First Anglo-Afghan War, looked for an Afghan 
leader who could guarantee British citizens safe passage out of the 
country.31 They found that leader in Abdur Rahman, the grandson of Dost 
Mohammad Khan.32 Once in power, Rahman, who became known as the 
Iron Amir, was able to maintain his rule for more than two decades. 
33During this time he squelched more than forty uprisings and created a 
                                                                                                                              
23 Wahab and Youngerman suggest that General Elphinstone may have been senile. Id. at 
84–85. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 89–97. 
26 Id. at 89–93. 
27 Id. at 90; See also BARFIELD, supra note 13, at 141. 
28 BARFIELD, supra note 13, at 141–42. 
29 Id. 
30 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 91; See also BARFIELD, supra note 13, at 
141–42. 
31 BARFIELD, supra note 13, at 146–47. 
32 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra at note 13, at  95 
33 Id. 
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powerful police state that left the country isolated and economically 
impoverished.34 Rahman claimed his rule was divinely sanctioned and 
declared that he was the imam, or the spiritual leader, of the country.35 He 
subsequently established his own court system that applied Shariah law as 
he, the imam, interpreted it.36 When Rahman died, no one contested his 
son’s right to succeed him.37 
The last King of Afghanistan was Mohammed Zahir Shah, who ruled 
from 1933 until he was ousted by a coup in 1973.38 During the first three 
decades of his rule, Zahir Shah was king in name only; his cousin, 
Mohammed Daoud, ran the country in his capacity as Prime Minister.39 
However, in 1963, Zahir Shah dismissed his cousin and initiated a number 
of social and economic reforms.40 However, his most significant 
contribution was the creation of a new constitution.41 This constitution, 
referred to as the 1964 Constitution, established a constitutional monarchy, 
created a two-house parliament, made provisions for free elections, gave 
political parties and media unprecedented freedom of speech, and 
guaranteed women the right to vote.42 Pictures from the late sixties and 
early seventies show women in western-style dresses and scarves studying 
and working with men.43 
Not all Afghans appreciated Zahir Shah’s reforms, and when he went to 
Europe for medical treatment, his cousin Daoud44 retook control in a 
                                                                                                                              
34 BARFIELD, supra note 13, at 147. 
35 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra at note 13, at 94–95. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 100. 
38 Id. at 132. 
39 BARFIELD, supra note 13, at 169–70. 
40 Id. at 170. 
41 See id. at 128-29. 
42 Id. 
43 Clayton Esterson, With Dust Removal, PBASE.COM, http://www.pbase.com/qleap/ 
image/120404891 (last visited June 30, 2013). 
44 “Daoud” is also spelled “Daud.” BARFIELD, supra note 13, at 170. 
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bloodless coup. In 1973, Daoud created a republic.45 It was short lived as 
five years later, in 1978, Daoud was killed by his former socialist allies who 
subsequently established a socialist government.46 However, that 
government lacked popular support and, in 1979, the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan. This invasion was the beginning of a ten-year war between 
these two nations that took the lives of approximately one million Afghans 
and created more than three million refugees.47 
According to a number of commentators, Afghanistan was the 
battleground in which the United States and the Soviet Union fought the 
Cold War.48 Although the United States did not send troops to Afghanistan, 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated within the country and, 
along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, provided financial support to the 
mujahedeen, or holy warriors,49 which was made up of a number of 
different groups.50 
The most radical of these groups was Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) led 
by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Ghilzai Pashtun.51 Some sources believe that, 
because of his fierce determination and organizational skills, Hekmatyar 
received many of the arms and much of the financial aid sent to help the 
mujahedeen.52 For example, it is reported he received approximately one-
third of all CIA assistance along with the first anti-aircraft Stingers.53 A 
second, more moderate group, the Jamiat-i-Islami (Society of Islam), was 
led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik, and was supported by Tajiks and 
other non-Pashtuns.54 A third group was led by the charismatic Ahmad Shah 
                                                                                                                              
45 Id. at 170. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 170–71. 
48 Id. at 311-12. 
49 Id. at ix. 
50 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 173–74. 
51 Id. at 173. 
52 Id. at 177-78. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 175. 
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Massoud, a Tajik who operated out of the Panjhir Valley55 located just north 
of Kabul.  Massoud was a brilliant tactician and was able to disrupt the 
Soviet supply line.56 
During the almost ten years of war, most of the international community 
condemned the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The General 
Assembly of the United Nations passed resolutions year after year calling 
for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.57 With the war taking 
a toll not only on Afghanistan, but also on the Soviet Union, in 1985 
Mikhail Gorbachev sought a diplomatic solution.58 The process took several 
years and did not end until 1988 when the Geneva Accords were signed.59 
The Accords guaranteed the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops by 
February 15, 1989, Afghanistan’s right to self-determination, and the right 
of refugees to return to Afghanistan without fear of persecution or 
harassment.60 The mujahedeen were not, however, included in the 
negotiations, and the group refused to accept the terms of the Accords.61 
Unfortunately, the withdrawal of the Soviets did not result in peace.62 
Although Dr. Mohammad Najibullah, who had served as President during 
the Soviet occupation, offered to negotiate a coalition government, the 
mujahedeen did not accept the offer, believing that they could easily 
                                                                                                                              
55 While in Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to visit the Panjshir Valley and Massoud’s 
tomb. In the valley there are hundreds, if not thousands, of Soviet tanks and vehicles 
which the Soviets abandoned when they retreated.  While initially some of the professors 
and students, who were Pashtuns, were reluctant to visit the valley and Massoud’s tomb, 
those who came seem to enjoy sightseeing in their own country. They also seemed to 
enjoy climbing in and out of the tanks and had a picnic along the river followed by lively 
games of soccer, badminton, and a traditional Pashtun game. 
56 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 175. 
57 Id. at 159. 
58 Id. at 169–70. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 170. 
61 AFGHANISTAN’S WEB SITE, Geneva Accords, http://www.afghanistans.com/ 
Information/History/GenevaAccords.htm (last visited June 30, 2013). 
62 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 188. 
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displace him.63 That did not happen, and Najibullah was able to stay in 
power for the next three years.64 However, in 1992, when the United 
Nations special envoy announced that he had brokered an agreement to 
hand over power, Najibullah fled, leaving no one in charge.65 
In the vacuum, two groups battled for control.66 Although Massoud asked 
the Afghanistan Interim Government (AIG) to provide a political 
framework for the post-Najubullah government, Hekmatyar, the Pashtun 
mujahedeen leader, attacked Kabul from the south before the Council could 
meet.67 Massoud, with the help of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a 
Uzbek,68 won the battle and established a Tajik/Uzbek coalition that 
controlled Kabul.69 When Ismail Kahn, a Tajik warlord who ruled the 
western part of Afghanistan from Herat, joined the coalition, the Pashtuns 
agreed to a power-sharing agreement brokered by Pakistan’s new Prime 
Minister, Nawaz Sharif.70 Under the Peshawar Agreement, signed in 1992, a 
moderate, Sebghatullah Mujadidi, was named as temporary president, and 
he and thirty delegates established the Republic of Afghanistan on April 28, 
1992.71 Rabbani was selected to become President, Massoud was named as 
Defense Minister, and Hekmatyar was named as Prime Minister.72 
Hekmatyar, however, refused to join the government.73 
                                                                                                                              
63 Id. at 170. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 192–93. 
66 Id. at 193. 
67 Id. 
68 General Abdul Rashid Dostum is a controversial figure who switched sides on a 
number of occasions and who is believed to be partly responsible for the alleged 
massacre of some 2,000 Taliban prisoners after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 
2001. GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, Abdul Rashid Dostum, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
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During the next four years, Hekmatyar continued to challenge the 
mujahedeen government. In the first year after Rabbani became president, 
30,000 civilians were killed and 100,000 injured.74 By 1996, almost seventy 
percent of Kabul’s buildings had been destroyed, at least 50,000 civilians 
had been killed, and the streets were controlled by criminals and 
undisciplined soldiers.75 Other cities, such as Kandahar, were near 
anarchy.76 
It is into this environment that the Taliban,77 led by Mullah Mohammed 
Omar,78 took control.79  According to popular stories, the Taliban’s first 
operation involved rescuing two girls who had been kidnapped and raped by 
a guerilla leader; the group then moved on to assisting Pakistan in securing 
trade routes.80 Within a year, the Taliban controlled twelve of the southern 
Pashtun provinces.81 Although initially defeated, the Taliban ultimately won 
the fight for Kabul and controlled about ninety percent of Afghanistan by 
1999.82 
Many observers believe Pakistan was instrumental in the rapid rise of the 
Taliban, citing the fact that, from the very beginning, the Taliban, most of 
whom were poorly educated, demonstrated the ability to plan, coordinate, 
                                                                                                                              
74 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 202–03. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 In Persian and Pashtu, the word “taliban” means “students.” .MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
Taliban, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/taliban (last visited Aug. 25, 2013). 
As a general rule, these students, all of whom are male, come from poor rural families. 
WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 202–03. 
78 In Afghanistan the term “mullah” is used to refer to Islamic clerics. 
DICTIONARY.COM, Mullah, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mullah?s=t (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2013). 
79 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 206..  For more information about Mullah 
Omar, see CNN, Mullah Mohammed Omar – Fast Facts, http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/ 
30/world/meast/mullah-mohammed-omar—-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Dec. 30, 
2012). 
80 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 206. 
81 Id. at 207. 
82 Id. 
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and execute sophisticated military operations.83 What the Taliban did not 
possess was the ability, or maybe even the interest, in actually governing. 
Mullah Omar, who had taken the title of emir al-muminin (commander of 
the faithful), was the ultimate authority for all religious and civil matters.84 
Although originally some Afghans welcomed the fact that the Taliban 
restored order, it did not take long for many, including Massoud, to 
challenge the Taliban and its repressive policies, which included a ban on 
playing or listening to music, dancing, and watching TV; a requirement that 
women be covered from head to toe; a prohibition against women leaving 
their homes without a male relative; a requirement for men that their beards 
be of a minimum length; and a general ban on photographs of people or 
things.85 
II.   POST-2001 AFGHANISTAN 
A. Osama bin Laden 
Osama bin Laden was born into a wealthy Saudi family and lived in 
Saudi Arabia until 1979, when he went to Pakistan to support the Afghan 
mujahedeen in their fight against the Russians by funneling arms, money, 
and fighters from the Arab world into Afghanistan.86 After the Russians 
withdrew from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia where he 
worked in his family’s construction business and helped establish an 
organization to aid veterans of the Afghan war.87 When Saudi Arabia 
allowed the United States to station troops within its borders in 1991, bin 
Laden became an activist, protesting against the presence of Americans in 
                                                                                                                              
83 Id. at 210. 
84 Id. at 214. 
85 Id. at 218. 
86 See LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER 71, 94, 97 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 
2006). 
87 Id. at 145. 
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the birthplace of Islam.88 As a result, Saudi Arabia expelled bin Laden in 
1991.89 
Between 1991 and 1994, bin Laden operated out of Sudan. During that 
time, bin Laden was credited with attempting to kill American soldiers in 
Yemen and with attacking American soldiers in Somalia.90 In 1996, Sudan, 
experiencing pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia, expelled 
bin Laden, and he subsequently moved back to Afghanistan. Between 1996 
and 2001, bin Laden used his bases in Afghanistan to train almost 11,000 
recruits.91 In exchange for being allowed to operate out of the country, bin 
Laden provided Mullah Omar with money and special favors, including 
reportedly killing Massoud on September 9, 2011.92 
Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States 
demanded that the Taliban extradite bin Laden.93 After Mullah Omar 
refused, the United States began bombing Afghanistan on October 7, 
2001.94 With the help of the Northern Alliance,95 the Taliban was quickly 
defeated. On December 6, 2011, Mullah Omar, along with bin Laden, 
slipped into Pakistan.96 
                                                                                                                              
88 Id. at 157–59. 
89 Id. at 154, 161, 194–95. 
90 Id. at 165, 174, 178. 
91 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 220. See also WRIGHT, supra note 79, at 
302. 
92 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 220–21. See also WRIGHT, supra note 79, 
at 354–55. 
93 WAHAB &YOUNGERMAN, supra note 13, at 224. 
94 Id. at 225–26. 
95 The term “Northern Alliance” is used to refer to the military wing of the Afghan 
government that was ousted by the Taliban and later fought against the Taliban. 
ABOUT.COM, Taliban and the Northern Alliance, http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/ 
weekly/aa092801a.htm (last visited June 30, 2013) Many of the members of the Northern 
Alliance were part of the Mujahedeen that fought the Russians. Id. Until he was 
assassinated on September 9, 2001, Massoud led the Northern Alliance. Id. 
96 It is not clear whether Mullah Omar is alive or dead. Joshua Norman, Dead? Alive? 
Who is Mullah Omar?, CNN (May 24, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
503543_162-20065811-503543.html (last visited June 30, 2013). 
76 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
B.  The Bonn Agreement 
Because the United States had invaded Afghanistan without having a 
plan for replacing the Taliban, the United States asked the United Nations to 
broker a deal for a new government.97 In accordance with this request, 
international leaders and a number of prominent Afghans met in Bonn, 
Germany, in December 2001, where they established the framework for a 
provisional government and distributed leadership roles within that 
provisional government.98 Although the Pashtuns were underrepresented 
during the talks because of their ties to the Taliban,99 a Pashtun, Hamid 
Karzai, was selected to head the provisional government.100 Members of the 
Northern Alliance were given control of most of the ministries, and the 
former king was given an honorary role.101 
C.  The 2004 Constitution 
In 2002, a Loya Jirja (grand assembly) approved the Bonn Agreement 
and the installation of Hamid Karzai as interim president.102 The next step 
was the drafting of the constitution. After the first nine-member drafting 
commission was unable to produce a draft, a second larger and more 
representative commission was appointed.103 While this commission was 
able to prepare a draft, Karzai was unhappy with the draft, and it was not 
made public until five weeks before the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirja, 
                                                                                                                              
97 BARFIELD, supra note 13, at 283. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 284. 
101 Id. 
102 As Barfield notes, the international community was concerned about process and it 
incorrectly believed that the Loya Jirja was the way that Afghans selected their leaders.  
Id. at 294–95. Although Loya Jirja were not often used, they have their roots in the 
Qur’an, which commands Muslims to shura, or consultation. GOV’T OF AFG., Traditional 
Loya Jirga, http://jirga.gov.af/en (last visited July 13, 2013). 
103 J. Alexander Their, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 557, 566–67 (2006-07). 
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which finally convened in December 2003.104 The 503 individuals who 
attended the Jirja represented various ethnic and political groups, with the 
exception of the Taliban, and included eighty-nine women.105 After heated 
battles, the Jirja approved the constitution, the preamble to which, as 
translated into English, reads as follows: 
We the people of Afghanistan: 
 Believing firmly in Almighty God, relying on 
His divine will and adhering to the Holy religion 
of Islam;  
 Realizing the previous injustices, miseries and 
innumerable disasters which have befallen our 
country;  
 Appreciating the sacrifices, historical struggles, 
jihad and just resistance of all the peoples of 
Afghanistan, admiring the supreme position of 
the martyrs of the country’s  freedom;  
 Comprehending that a united, indivisible 
Afghanistan belongs to all its tribes and peoples;  
 Observing the United Nations Charter as well as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  
And in order to:  
 Strengthen national unity, safeguard 
independence, national sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity of the country;  
 Establish an order based on the peoples’ will and 
democracy;  
 Form a civil society void of oppression, atrocity, 
discrimination as well as violence, based on rule 
of law, social justice, protecting integrity and 
                                                                                                                              
104 Id. at 568. 
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human rights, and attaining peoples’ freedoms 
and fundamental rights;  
 Strengthen political, social, economic, as well as 
defense institutions;  
 Attain a prosperous life and sound living 
environment for all inhabitants of this land;  
 And, eventually, regain Afghanistan’s 
appropriate place in the international family;  
Have, herein, approved this constitution in accordance with the 
historical, cultural, and social realities, as well as requirements of 
time through our elected representatives in the Loya Jirga, dated 
January 3, 2004, held in the city of Kabul.106 
Although one of Afghanistan’s earlier constitutions, the 1923 
Constitution, relied on the principle of complementarity, that is, that all 
cases should be decided in accordance with the principles of Shariah and 
the general civil and criminal laws,107 the 2004 Constitution is based on the 
principle of repugnancy: no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of 
Islam.108  The first three articles of the 2004 Constitution read as follows: 
Chapter 1: The State 
Article 1: Afghanistan shall be an Islamic Republic, independent, 
unitary, and indivisible state. 
Article 2: The sacred religion of Islam is the religion of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Followers of other faiths shall be 
free within the bounds of law in the exercise and performance of 
their religious rituals. 
                                                                                                                              
106 THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, pmbl. available at 
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/cms/uploads/images/Constitution/The%20Constitutio
n.pdf. 
107 Astri Suhrke & Kaja Borchgrevink, Negotiating Justice Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 
51 no. 2 CRIME,LAW & SOC. CHANGE 211, 217 (2009). 
108 Id. at 221. 
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Article 3: No law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the 
holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan.109 
Chapter Seven of the 2004 Constitution creates the judicial branch of the 
government.110 Within that chapter, Article 116 states that “[t]he judiciary 
shall be an independent organ of the state of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan.” It then goes on to create a “Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, 
as well as Primary Courts whose organization and authority shall be 
regulated by law.”111 Article 117 states that the Supreme Court will have 
“nine members who are appointed by the president for a period of ten years 
with the approval of the Wolesi Jirga [House of the People] with 
observance of the provisions of last paragraph of the Article 50 and Article 
118 of this Constitution.”112 
The draft of the constitution submitted to President Karzai contained a 
provision that would have created a separate constitutional court.113 Like the 
constitutional courts in other countries,114 this court would have been 
independent and would have had jurisdiction to resolve all constitutional 
disputes,115 for example, whether there is a conflict between the statement 
in the Preamble that states that Afghanistan observes the United Nations 
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the tenets of 
Islam. This provision was removed before the draft was submitted to the 
Loya Jirja, in part because of fears that a constitutional court would assume 
powers similar to those exercised by Iran’s Guardian Council, which must 
approve all proposed legislation and has been empowered since 1991 to 
                                                                                                                              
109 THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 106. 
110 Id. at art. I-III. 
111 Id. 
112 The Wolesi Jirga is the lower house of the National Assembly. See id. at art. 82. 
113 JOHN DEMPSEY & J. ALEXANDER THEIR, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, RESOLVING THE 
CRISIS OVER CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN AFGHANISTAN, at 2 (Mar. 2009), 
available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/USIP_0309_2.PDF. 
114 See e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, http://www.constitutionalcourt. 
org.za/site/home.htm (last visited July 13, 2013). 
115 DEMPSEY & THEIR, supra note 113, at 2. 
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reject or accept all candidates for parliament and the presidency.116 Instead, 
Article 121 gives some of the powers usually given to a constitutional court 
to the Supreme Court: “At the request of the Government, or courts, the 
Supreme Court shall review the laws, legislative decrees, international 
treaties as well as international covenants for their compliance with the 
Constitution and their accordance with the law.”117 However, Article 157, 
which is located within the chapter setting out miscellaneous provisions, 
states that “[t]he Independent Commission for supervision of the 
implementation of the Constitution shall be established in accordance with 
the provisions of the law. Members of this Commission shall be appointed 
by the President with the endorsement of the House of People.”118 
Initially, it appeared as if there was agreement that the Supreme Court 
had the power to interpret the constitution. Between 2004 and 2007, the 
Supreme Court decided several cases in which it did just that.119 However, 
that agreement ended when, in 2007, the National Assembly invoked 
Article 157 and passed a law creating the Independent Commission for the 
Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC).120 Although 
President Karzai vetoed the law, the National Assembly overrode that veto 
and passed the law despite a decision from the Supreme Court determining 
it was unconstitutional.121 Under the law, the ICSIC would be comprised of 
seven commissioners who would have the power to interpret the 
                                                                                                                              
116 Id. 
117 THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 106, at art. 121. 
118 Id. at art.154. See also INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFGHANISTAN: THE LONG, HARD ROAD TO 
THE 2014 TRANSITION 13 (Oct. 8, 2012), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/ 
media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/236-afghanistan-the-long-hard-road-to-the-2014-
transition.pdf. 
119 DEMPSEY & THEIR, supra note 113, at 3. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. For an English translation of the law, see Sari Kouvo, Six Years Late, the 
Constitutional Commission is Formed; But Will It Take on President and Parliament?, 
AFG. ANALYST NETWORK, July 3, 2010,  http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/six-years-
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constitution “on the request of the President, the National Assembly, the 
Supreme Court, and the Executive.”122 In 2010, the National Assembly 
approved five commissioners; it has not, however, approved the last two, 
and, as a result, it is not clear whether the ICSIC has been legally 
constituted.123 So far, the ISCIS has published only two advisory opinions: 
one pertaining to the US-run prison at Bagram, and a second condemning 
the burning of copies of the Qur’an at the prison.124 
Thus, as of the publication of this article, the conflict between the 
Afghanistan Supreme Court and the ICSIC has not been resolved.125 In 
addition, judges whose terms have already expired hold two of the nine 
positions on the Supreme Court, and the terms of three other judges are due 
to expire in August of 2013.126 
D.  The State System, the Informal System, and the Taliban System 
While the Afghanistan Constitution mentions only one legal system, 
three legal systems operate in Afghanistan: a state system, an informal 
system, and, in the areas controlled by the Taliban, a Taliban system. 
1. The State System 
The 2004 Constitution created a state system similar to those used in 
western countries. It is comprised of the police, courts, judges, prosecutors, 
and the prison service.127 Although these actors are supposed to work 
                                                                                                                              
122 INT’L CRISIS GRP.,  supra note 110, at 4–5; Kouvo, supra note 113. As currently 
drafted, the law uses the word “and,” which suggests that request must come from the 
President, the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, and the Executive. Given the 
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126 INT’L CRISIS GRP. supra note 118, at 14. 
127 Ali Wardak, State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan: The Need for 
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together, they often do not. A judge from the Kunduz province described 
what happened in one case: 
The main problem for the court is lack of proper cooperation from 
the Police Department…For example, once the police captured 17 
pounds of heroin in a truck. The drug was carefully stored among 
the fruit cartons. There were two people in the car, the driver and a 
passenger. After initial investigation, the police released the  driver 
without consulting with the district prosecutor’s office and sent the 
passenger, who was from Jalalabad, to the court. When we 
investigated the  case, we found out that the passenger was beaten 
very badly. On the other hand, he totally denied all charges and 
accused the driver as the real smuggler. We sent a letter to the 
police department, demanding the re-arrest of the driver. The 
police simply refused and wrote back a very illogical answer: we 
will arrest the driver when he is ready to be arrested. Then we had 
to close the case because of lack of evidence.128 
While this lack of coordination is a problem, an even bigger problem is 
corruption.129 In working with the professors and students in mock trial 
exercises, I was at first amused by their comments about how they would 
bribe the prosecutor, the judge, or one of the jurors. I thought that they were 
just having fun with the exercises. However, during subsequent 
conversations, I learned that most Afghans believe that, at least at the level 
of the primary courts, which is the Afghan court of original jurisdiction, 
there is widespread corruption. 
Unfortunately, they are correct. A 2010 study conducted by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime found that Afghans paid the equivalent 
of $2.5 billion US dollars, or 23 percent of the Afghan gross national 
                                                                                                                              
INST., AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (Jan. 2003), 
available at http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/5888.pdf. 
128 Notes from the Interview with the Judge (2013) (on file with author). 
129 Wardak, supra note 127, at 415. 
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product, in bribes in 2009.130 In urban areas, Afghan citizens report most of 
the bribes are paid to police officers, custom officers, judges, and municipal 
officers, in that order.131 In rural areas, citizens report most bribes are paid 
to prosecutors, judges, custom officers, and police officers.132 
Because of the corruption and other obstacles, for example, the time that 
it takes to resolve a dispute and the cost of travel, most Afghans do not use 
the country’s judicial system.133 Instead, they rely either on the long-
established village-based dispute resolution processes, or, in areas in which 
the Taliban has a strong presence, the Taliban’s legal system.134 
2. The Informal System135 
Until you have been there, it is hard to appreciate the impact that 
geography has on Afghanistan. Even though Afghanistan is often thought of 
as an important stop on the Silk Road, today there are relatively few 
roads.136 In fact, few would think about trying to drive from Kabul, which is 
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BODIES (2005), available at  http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF590.pdf 
136 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, The World Factbook: Country Comparisons: 
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in the center of the country, to Herat in the west.137 A flight over the country 
reveals its center is mountainous, with only a few small villages in isolated 
valleys.138 
Additionally, different tribal groups dominate each region in 
Afghanistan. Most of the people in the south and the east are Pashtuns,139 
and most of the people in the north and the west are Tajiks.140 Other groups 
include the Hazara, who are mostly in the central part of Afghanistan, and 
the Uzbek (9 percent), Aimak (4 percent), and Turkmen (3 percent).141 
Given Afghanistan’s geography and various tribal and ethnic groups, it is 
not surprising that historically most disputes were resolved locally and that 
practices and decisions would vary from village to village and even from 
district to district.142 However, almost all of these systems rely on jirgas 
(Pashtun) or shuras (Tazik), which are made up of respected members of the 
community and which base their decisions on the customary law of the area 
in which they operate.143 Perhaps out of necessity, most of these jirgas and 
shuras place an emphasis on reconciliation and keeping the peace within 
their communities.144 As Wardak notes, while the State system relies on 
retributive justice, the jirgas and shuras rely on restorative justice.145 
                                                                                                                              
137 Although there have been a number of projects designed to improve the roads, there 
are still a number of unexploded land mines, and robberies are common. International 
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Those serving on jirgas and shuras do not receive any compensation and 
are considered to be the impartial representatives of those involved in the 
dispute. Those involved in the dispute place their trust in the members of 
the councils to resolve the dispute in a way that is in the best interests of 
both those involved as well as the larger community.146 The effectiveness of 
a particular jirga or shura rests on the reputations of those who serve on 
it.147 
Although most Afghans give higher marks to the informal justice systems 
than they do to the State system, the informal justice systems are not 
without problems. From the Western perspective, jirgas and shuras are 
problematic because those who serve on them often lack knowledge about 
the provisions set out in the Constitution and other positive law.148 In most 
instances, jirgas or shuras apply customary law, which is often synonymous 
with Shariah law as it is practiced in that community.149 As a consequence, 
the jirgas or shuras may use “baad,” which involves the giving of a girl or 
woman to another family as a way to resolve a dispute or as payment for a 
debt.150 In addition, while occasionally women serve on a jirga or shura, 
most of the time they do not. The failure to include women in jirga and 
shura reinforces the belief of some Afghans that women are inferior to men 
and may indicate there is no one on the councils who can ensure the rights 
of women are protected.151 Finally, some Afghans have stated that local 
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commanders, warlords, and other powerful government officials sometimes 
interfere with a jirga or shura, and that community institutions have been 
weakened by decades of war and economic conditions worsened by 
droughts.152 
3. The Taliban 
In the absence of a working formal or informal justice system, it appears 
the Taliban is once again filling the void. Even though most Afghans still 
fear the Taliban, in some areas they turn to it  to settle grievances.153 In one 
of the few stories about “Taliban judges,” Afghans told an NPR reporter 
that “the militants — unlike the country’s official court system — get things 
done quickly and without asking for bribes.”154 Later in the report, Judge 
Mullah Nasrat Ramani, a graduate of Kabul University, states the 
following:155 “We are mobile judges. Sometimes we go to the people, and 
sometimes they come to us. We don’t have a courtroom, and we’re not 
official. But we are sanctioned by the Taliban leadership to carry out justice 
using Islamic law.”156 
Another story published in the April 15, 2013, issue of Newsweek, 
describes a case involving a land dispute between a returning refugee who 
                                                                                                                              
non-state justice institutions; they are the characteristics of Afghan patriarchal society.” 
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wanted to reclaim land he asserted belonged to his family and another 
powerful family: 
The tension nearly ended in violence last year as Khan, his uncles, 
and the Ahmedzais took up arms and prepared for battle. ‘There 
was a real danger of bloodshed,’ says the 33-year-old Khan, who 
runs a medical laboratory in the provincial capital, Gardez. Khan 
quickly ruled out taking his case to the official government courts, 
which he says are corrupt and plodding. But he didn’t want to risk 
a shootout, so instead he decided to take the land feud to the 
Taliban’s Islamic court. The Ahmedzais agreed, saying they had 
no objection to submitting their claim to the Taliban’s court. 
‘Taliban courts are easier, more transparent, and quick, and stand 
on Islamic law,’ says Khan. ‘If a Taliban judge is found to be 
corrupt, he will be beheaded.’ 
The Taliban may not be popular, but their courts seem to be. Even 
a senior adviser to Afghan President Hamid Karzai admits that 
many Afghans prefer Taliban courts to the government’s legal 
system. And a member of Parliament from Zabul province, Qadar 
Qalatwal, agrees, saying local government courts are simply 
hopeless. ‘The local government is drowning in corruption so no 
one trusts the justice system,’ he says.157 
There are, however, stories that horrify both those in the West and in 
Afghanistan. For example, in August 2010, Afghan authorities released a 
video showing a couple being beheaded after a Taliban court found them 
guilty of adultery, and in April 2013, the news media reported that members 
of the Taliban had abducted two truck drivers and then, without the benefit 
of anesthesia, amputated a hand and a foot of each driver.158 One of the 
drivers is quoted as saying, “There was no mullah, no judge, nobody,” he 
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http://contentviewer.adobe.com/s/Newsweek/c5cabc60bd7a45d4a6b493fc0ba1ffcf/com.n
ewsweek.20130412/14_nb_reporter_14.html. 
158 Humayun Hadid & Johannes Dell, Summary Amputations: Taliban Justice in 
Afghanistan, RAWA NEWS (Apr. 27, 2013),  http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2013/04 
/27/summary-amputations-taliban-justice-in-afghanistan.html. 
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says. “There were only Taliban. They were all laughing and making fun 
while they did this. They never listened to what we had to say.”159 
E.  Rule of Law Projects 
It is unclear how many initiatives have been undertaken in Afghanistan 
with the goal of “promoting the rule of law.” Although Italy took the lead in 
providing assistance to the justice sector after the fall of the Taliban, a 
number of other countries, including the United States, also initiated 
projects.160 Most agree, though, that the judicial system is still not working 
despite ten years of aid. As the International Crisis Group wrote in 2010, 
“Afghanistan’s justice system is in a catastrophic state of disrepair. The 
majority of Afghans still have little or no access to judicial institutions.”161 
Several reasons exist for this failure. First, as of 2004, there were 
relatively few judges trained in secular law or Islamic law.162 The first Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, Faisal Ahmad Shinwari, had 
no experience as a judge and had not studied secular law.163 While most 
                                                                                                                              
159 Id. 
160 Ali Wardak, State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan: The Need for 
Synergy, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1145 (2012); Suhreke & Borchgrevink, supra note 100, at 
220. See also  INT’L CRISIS GRP., REFORMING AFGHANISTAN’S BROKEN JUDICIARY 
(Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/files/asia/south-
asia/afghanistan/195%20reforming%20afghanistans%20broken%20judiciary.pdf. 
161 Nick Grono, Deputy President of the Int’l Crisis Grp., Rule of Law and the Justice 
System in Afghanistan (Apr. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2011/rule-of-law-and-the-
justice-system-in-afghanistan.aspx. 
162 Suhreke & Borchgrevink, supra note 107, at 219. 
163 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional Justice (Jan. 
28, 2003), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-
asia/afghanistan/045-afghanistan-judicial-reform-and-transitional-justice.aspx; Carlotta 
Gall, Afghan Lawmakers Review Court Nominees, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/17/world/asia/17afghan.html?_r=0. As might be 
expected, the decisions of this court reflected the backgrounds of those making them. 
During Shinwari’s term, the Supreme Court sought to ban a candidate who questioned 
whether polygamy was in keeping with the spirit of Islam; called for an end to cable 
television service in the country; upheld the death penalty for two journalists convicted of 
blasphemy for saying the Islam being practiced in the country was reactionary; banned 
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current members of the Supreme Court are well educated,164 many of the 
primary court judges are not.165 
Second, western donors focused on exporting their own systems of 
justice.166 They introduced laws based on western laws,167 helped build and 
furnish courthouses, and offered training to judges and prosecutors.168  
What they did not do is seek out experts from other Muslim countries, for 
example, Turkey or Saudi Arabia, or even consult with each other.169 As a 
consequence, many of the projects did not reflect the tenets of Islam or 
                                                                                                                              
women from singing on television; and ruled that a girl, given as a bride when she was 
nine years old, could not get a divorce from her abusive husband, notwithstanding a law 
that makes it illegal for girls under 16 to marry. Scott Baldauf, The West Pushes to 
Reform Traditionalist Afghan Courts, RAWA NEWS (Feb. 21, 2006), 
http://www.rawa.org/court.htm. 
164 The chief justice, Abdul Salam Azimi. Azimi,  received his Masters degree in Shariah 
and Law from Al-Azhar University in Egypt, studied comparative law at George 
Washington University, worked for the University of Nebraska helping to develop 
educational opportunities for Afghans living in Pakistan,  and played a significant role in 
drafting the 2004 constitution. Biography of Chief Justice, SUPREME COURT OF ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF AFG., http://supremecourt.gov.af/en/page/616 (last visited July 13, 2013). 
The other eight justices, Mohammad Qasem Hashemzai; Abdul Rashid Rashed; Gholam 
Nabi Nawai; Bahuddin Baha; Zamen Ali Behsudi; Mohammad Qasem; Mohammad Alim 
Nasimi; and Mohammad Omar Barakzai, are also well educated. Biography of Supreme 
Court Members, SUPREME COURT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG., 
http://supremecourt.gov.af/en/page/619 (last visited July 13, 2013). 
165 Suhreke & Borchgrevink, supra note 107, at 220. 
166 As Suhreke and Borchgrevink note, “The inclination of Western donors to fasten onto 
its own legal tradition with the texture of Afghan law was hardly surprising.  It reflected 
the ideological division between Islam and the West that had justified the US-led 
intervention in the first place.” Suhrke & Borchgrevink, supra note 107, at 214. 
167 While Italy has help build, or rebuild a number of court facilities, some of its projects 
have been controversial. Suhrke & Borchgrevink, supra note 100, at 213. A prime 
example is a project in which an Italian magistrate (with the help of consultants from the 
United States) drafted a code of criminal procedure for Afghanistan that was based on the 
Italian code. Id. Because the Italian magistrate did not consult with Afghan officials, 
those officials asked President Karzai to reject the draft. Id. The Italian government, 
however, threatened to withdraw funding for related projects unless the draft was 
approved. Id. 
168 Wardak, supra note 160, at 1148. 
169 Suhrke & Borchgrevink, supra note 107, at 220. 
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Afghan cultures, and those sponsoring the projects sometimes worked at 
cross purposes. 
As a result, most rule of law projects have had little impact170 and, 
arguably, what impact they have had has been negative. For instance, on 
June 11, 2013, a suicide bomber targeted employees of the Supreme Court 
of Afghanistan as they were leaving work, killing seventeen and injuring 
many more.171 The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that 
their fighters “had taken down judges who obey Western powers.”172 
III. THE ULEMA173  
While Afghanistan’s Muslims174 do act as a single body with a set 
structure or hierarchy, there are shura e ulema, or religious councils, that 
operate at the national, provincial, and district levels.175 At the national 
level, there are instances in which the National Ulema Council176 has 
supported one of President Karzai’s policies, for example, the Karzai 
government’s policy that growing poppies is un-Islamic, and there are times 
when Karzai has supported a declaration made by the Council.177 
                                                                                                                              
170 RACHEL KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: NEXT GENERATION 
REFORM 5 (2012). 
171 Afghanistan Supreme Court in Kabul Targeted in Car-Bomb Attack; At Least 17 




173 In Arabic, “ulema” is spelled “ulama.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, Ulema, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ulema (last visited Aug. 26, 2013). 
174 80 percent are Sunni Muslim and 19 percent are Shia Muslim. CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, supra note 5. 
175 Suhrke & Borchgrevink, supra note 107, at 221. 
176 The National Ulema Council is funded by the government. Judicial Power and 
Branches, AFG. LANGUAGE & CULTURE PROGRAM, http://larc.sdsu.edu/alcp/resources/ 
afghanistan/government/judicial-power-and-branches (it is on the first page)/ (last visited 
Aug. 26 2013). The head of the Council is the former Chief Justice of the Afghanistan 
Supreme Court, Fazl Hadi Shinwari. Id. 
177 Suhrke & Borchgrevink, supra note 107, at 221–22. 
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A prime example of the latter involves a declaration made by the 
National Ulema Council in March 2012.178 Some of the statements made at 
the beginning of that declaration are consistent with the 2004 Constitution’s 
granting of equal rights to men and women. The following is one English 
translation of that part of the declaration: 
Unlike other civilizations and societies of the present and the past, 
the sacred religion of Islam – in recognition of the fundamental 
role of women in nurturing the society – offers women many civil 
and social rights, and human dignity and honor. 
In the centuries before Islam, and among human civilizations and 
nations, women were deprived of any kind of human and social 
rights. They were treated as cheap property and were even buried 
alive. But by the advent of the globe-illuminating sun [that was] 
the sacred religion of Islam, many rights were given to women 
according to nature, such as: 
A.   The right to property, ownership and commerce 
B.  The right to inheritance according to the principles of the 
sacred Shariah of Islam 
C. The right to mehr [very roughly, dower], which is 
exclusively the woman’s [property] and no one has the right to 
take it without her consent. All other practices known as 
toyana, shareeb, etc. do not have a basis in the Shariah. 
D.  The right to choose a spouse according to her own will. 
Forcibly marrying an adult woman is not allowed, although 
consultation with the guardians – which is a religious rule – is 
practiced 
E.  Women, like men, have dignity and are beings with 
freedom; therefore, exchanging a woman for someone’s blood 
(badal), or for [establishing] peace, or exchanging a woman for 
                                                                                                                              
178 Afghan Concern Over ‘Guidelines for Women,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012),  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17272935; Sari Kouvo, A Slippery Slope: What 
Happened to Women’s Rights in March 2012?, AFG. ANALYST NETWORK (Apr. 6, 2012), 
http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=2642. 
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another’s dower are haram (forbidden under Islamic law) and 
prohibited under the Shariah.179 
The declaration does, though, contain other provisions that limit the rights 
of women: 
F. Women cannot be inherited. Similarly, there are many other 
rights, granted to a woman under the religion of Islam, which 
are observed. But, where a Muslim woman has many rights, 
[she also] has duties and obligations, such as: 
 Adherence, in faith and action, to the orders and 
prohibitions of Islam’s sacred Shariah 
 Complete adherence and observance of the hijab 
[according to the Shariah], which protects the 
dignity and personality of the woman 
 Avoiding mingling with stranger men in various 
social situations, such as education, shopping, 
the office and other affairs of life 
 In consideration of the clarity of verses 1 and 34 
of Surah an-Nisa’ [of the Qur’an], men are 
fundamental and women are secondary; also, 
lineage is derived from the man. Therefore, the 
use of words and expressions that contradict the 
sacred verses must be strictly avoided. 
 Respecting [the orders] about the multiplicity of 
wives (polygamy), which are in accordance with 
clear orders of the Qur’an 
 Avoiding travel without a [Shariah-sanctioned] 
mahram (male companion) 
                                                                                                                              
179 English Translation of Ulema Council’s Declaration About Women, AFG. ANALYSIS 
(Mar. 4, 2012), https://afghanistananalysis.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/english 
-translation-of-ulema-councils-declaration-about-women/. 
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 Adherence to the clear orders of Muhammad’s 
Shariah in case of divorce 
It needs to be said that teasing, harassment and beating of women 
without a Shariah-compliant reason, as set forth clearly in the 
Glorious Qur’an, is prohibited. Afghanistan’s Ulema Council 
requests the judicial and law-enforcement organs of the country to 
punish, in accordance with Muhammad’s Shariah and national 
laws, the perpetrators of any kind of assault from persons against 
women.180 
While the declaration does not have the force of law, President Karzai 
endorsed it, stating “The clerics’ council of Afghanistan did not put any 
limitations on women. . . It is the Shariah law of all Muslims and all 
Afghans.”181 A few days later, in his speech for International Women’s 
Day, Karzai stated that the Western media had misinterpreted his earlier 
statement, and he asserted that Afghan women enjoy their Constitutional 
rights.182 
As might be expected, many, both inside and outside of Afghanistan, 
have criticized Karzai for his support of the declaration, stating the 
President is giving up rights that women have gained in the last ten years in 
an attempt to appease the Taliban in hopes that it will agree to some type of 
peace agreement.183 Additionally, activists have criticized the international 
community for its failure to condemn the declaration, noting that “[n]one of 
the key international actors – the United States, the United Nations or the 
                                                                                                                              
180 Id. 
181 Hamid Karzai Backs Clerics’ Move to Limit Afghan Women’s Rights, THE GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/06/hamid-karzai-afghanistan-
womens-rights; Afghan President Backs Strict Guidelines for Women, CBS NEWS (Mar. 
6, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57391568/afghan-president-backs-
strict-guidelines-for-women/; Kouvo, supra note 178. 
182 Kouvo, supra note 178. 
183 Id. See also Sean Carberry, The Afghan Battle of a Law to Protect Women, NPR (Feb. 
20, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/20/172491435/the-afghan-battle-over-a-law-to-
protect-women. 
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European Union – made direct references to the National Ulema Council’s 
statement in their International Women’s Day messages.”184 
Equally troubling is the Ulema Council’s November 28, 2012, request to 
President Karzai to create a new Dar al-Ifta, an institute made up of Islamic 
scholars that would have the power to issue fatwas that are legally 
binding.185 To date, Karzai has not publically responded to the request. 
According to Siamak Heravi, a spokesperson, Karzai must first consider the 
constitutional implications of the request: “[The request] needs 
consideration because the work of a Dar al-Ifta and the Afghan Supreme 
Court may overlap. The clerics know this, so they left it for the president to 
consider. This issue will be discussed more in the future. But as for now, no 
decision has been made.”186 
IV.   WHAT I SAID AND WHAT ELSE I MIGHT HAVE SAID 
I need to begin this section by emphasizing that the professors who 
drafted the letter set out at the beginning of this article are Pashtuns who 
teach Shariah law at two of Afghanistan’s most conservative universities. 
Other Afghan professors, and particularly professors who teach secular law 
at some of the country’s more liberal universities, would disagree with 
many of the statements set out in the letter. For example, while the 
professors from Shariah faculties want the United States to leave 
                                                                                                                              
184 Kouvo, supra note 178. For a copy of Ambassador Crocker’s message, see 
Ambassador Crocker Statement on International Women (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://kabul.usembassy.gov/wd-st.html.  See also Point of View in Afghanistan on Ulema 
Council’s Statement on Women, RELIEF WEB (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/points-view-afghanistan-ulema-councils-statement-
women. 
185 Ron Synovitz & Ahmad Shebar, Afghan Clerics Want Power to Issue Legally Binding 
Fatwas (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-ulema-council-fatwas-
clerics-constitution/24783981.html#hash=relatedInfoContainer. See also National Ulema 
Council Seeks More Executive Power, TOLO NEWS (Nov. 24, 2012), 
http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/8464-national-ulema-council-calls-seeks-
executive-power. 
186 Synovitz & Shebar, supra note 185. 
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Afghanistan, other professors want the United States to stay. In particular, 
women who study and teach law are worried that, once the United States 
leaves, they will not be allowed to finish their degrees, or they will be 
forced out of their teaching positions.   
A. Should All Westerners Study Shariah law? 
One of the points that came up regularly in my conversations with the 
professors was the need for Westerners to study Shariah law. Thus, one of 
the first statements made in their letter “that all American law professors 
should study Islamic, or Shariah,187 law and that they should learn about 
Islamic law from Islamic scholars” did not take me by surprise. Although 
not all US law professors need to learn about Shariah law, I agree that more 
of us should. 
There are good reasons for doing so. First, according to a 2009 study, 
Islam is the second largest religion in the world, with 1.57 billion 
adherents.188 Second, much of the United States’ foreign policy decisions 
relate to or affect countries in which the majority of the population is 
Muslim.189  As a consequence, at least some of us need to know enough 
about Islam and Shariah law so that we can distinguish facts from 
fabrications and mainstream beliefs from those on the fringe. If we are 
going to do what the professors ask and take an active role in making 
suggestions that will help solve the world’s problems, we need to 
                                                                                                                              
187 When Muhammad first used the term in the 620s, shariah (also spelled Sharia and 
Shari’a) “conveyed the idea of a direct path to water – a route of considerable importance 
to a desert people –and at a time when no one systematically differentiated between the 
world that was and the world that ought to be. . . .” Sadakat Kadri, HEAVEN ON EARTH: A 
JOURNEY THROUGH SHARI’A LAW FROM THE DESERTS OF ANCIENT ARABIA TO THE 
STREETS OF THE MODERN MUSLIM WORLD 12 (2012). 
188 MAPPING THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION: A REPORT ON THE SIZE AND 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD’S MUSLIM POPULATION, THE PEW FORUM (Oct. 2009),  
http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/Demographics/Muslimpopulation.pdf. 
189 See Juan Cole, Islamophobia and American Foreign Policy Rhetoric: The Bush Years 
and After, in ISLAMOPHOBIA: THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
127–40.] (eds. John L. Esposito & Ibrahim Kalin 2011). 
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understand the histories, the religions, and the legal systems of the countries 
that our policies impact. 
B. Why Does the West Object to Afghanistan Applying Islamic Law? 
A more difficult conversation related to the professors’ fifth point: the 
question about why those of us in the West do not want Afghanistan to 
apply Islamic law. 
Although I probably should have expected the question, I was taken by 
surprise, both by the question and by the sincerity with which it was asked. 
Consequently, instead of responding, I sidestepped it, asking the professors 
about the National Ulema Council’s March 2012 declaration. Did the 
professors think that some of the statements about women violated the 
Afghanistan Constitution? When one of the professors answered that the 
Constitution needed to be read in light of the provisions of the Holy Qur’an, 
the others nodded their approval. I then asked if that meant women did not 
have the same rights as men. While I understood the answer to be yes, it 
was framed in terms of the individual’s path to Allah. According to the 
professors, the path to Allah, or the Shariah, was different for men and 
women. The Council’s statements should be read as providing guidance to 
women about how to comply with the Qur’an. The bottom line is that I did 
not answer the question. 
Since returning from Afghanistan, I have asked a number of people the 
professors’ question of why we don’t want Afghanistan to apply Islamic 
law. Some have answered that the issue is not whether Afghanistan is an 
Islamic state; instead, the issue is whether Afghanistan harbors terrorists. 
Others, mostly women, expressed concern over the fact that some of the 
tenets of Islam, at least as interpreted by some Muslims, violate the human 
rights of women and children and, maybe, even men. Only a few have 
talked about what has been labeled Islamophobia, the fear of Muslims or 
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their politics or culture.190 And finally, only a few talked about the 
separation of church and state. 
Had I been less cautious, I would have made all four points, and I 
probably would have started with the last one. As someone who was born, 
raised, and educated in the United States, I have internalized the value that 
individuals should have the freedom to choose their religion or to choose 
not to practice a religion. In addition, or as a consequence, I believe that 
government and religion serve different purposes and should operate in 
different spheres. It was not until I talked to the professors that I began to 
understand the extent to which some Afghans viewed government as simply 
a tool for helping individuals navigate the path to Allah. As the professors 
explained, the role of government and the judicial system is not so much to 
help individuals and groups negotiate their relationships with each other, 
but to help guide them to Allah. That insight resulted in my own “ah ha” 
moment and also helped me understand why I was uncomfortable at such a 
fundamental level with the idea of an Islamic state. 
Discussing the second point, that the way some individuals interpret the 
Qur’an violates women’s and children’s human rights, I wish that I had 
been more direct. However, as a practical matter, I was a guest in the 
professors’ country, and the professors always treated me with respect. 
Instead of expressing any kind of disapproval when I told them that I had 
walked to the market and to my guesthouse by myself, they asked whether I 
had purchased anything and, if I had, whether I had paid a fair price. There 
                                                                                                                              
190 Islamophobia, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ 
islamophobia (last visited July 13, 2013). In its August 30, 2010, issue, Time Magazine’s 
cover story was titled “Islamophobia: Does America Have a Muslim Problem?” Bobby 
Ghosh, Islamophobia: Does America Have a Muslim Problem, TIME (Aug. 30, 2010) 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2011936-1,00.html. According to the 
article, the intolerance against Muslims has deepened in the last few years: “Although the 
American strain of Islamophobia lacks some of the traditional elements of religious 
persecution — there’s no sign that violence against Muslims is on the rise, for instance — 
there’s plenty of anecdotal evidence that hate speech against Muslims and Islam is 
growing both more widespread and more heated.” Id. 
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was, however, no doubt that a separate set of rules existed for Afghan 
women and western women. 
I do regret not talking more explicitly about the reports I have read 
describing violence against women, the practice of giving young girls as 
payment for a debt (baad), and the way women are treated if they report a 
rape. Further, it more than bothers me that some men use the Qur’an to 
justify violence against women. I should have said more. 
However, even if I had spoken more bluntly, I doubt my words would 
have changed anyone’s mind. As we know from our own experiences, 
religious beliefs are usually deeply held, and when reinforced by culture, 
are resistant to change.191 I do hope, however, that my presence 
demonstrated that women can teach, practice law, and travel alone without 
disgracing either themselves or those with whom they interact. 
My third and fourth points are related. Some do not want Afghanistan to 
apply Islamic law because they reject or fear any religion other than their 
own. I suspect, however, that the more common concern is one based on the 
perceived connection between Islam and terrorism. People worry that, as an 
Islamic state, Afghanistan will do what Mullah Omar did and harbor al-
Qaida leaders, allowing them to use Afghanistan as a base for planning 
terrorist attacks against the United States. That could happen, particularly 
given how angry some Afghans are over the night raids and the United 
States’ continued presence in Afghanistan. 
While I am by no means an expert, I know that not all countries in which 
Islam is the official religion present a threat to the United States. For 
example, Islam is the official religion in Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia is a 
long-time friend of the United States,192 despite the fact that Saudi Arabia 
                                                                                                                              
191 In 2009, President Karzai issued a decree banning violence against women. Carberry, 
supra note 183. To date, however, the male-dominated Parliament has not made that 
decree permanent. Id. 
192 U.S. Relations with Saudi Arabia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR E. 
AFFAIRS (June 29, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3584.htm. 
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denies its citizens, and in particular women, many basic rights.193 Saudi 
Arabia has also been aggressive in punishing those associated with al-
Qaida.194 I also know that, in 2011, the United States government estimated 
there were al-Qaida affiliates in more than seventy countries,195 and recent 
events illustrate the influence of these groups in Yemen, Sudan, and parts of 
northern Africa. 
The bottom line is that Afghanistan is an Islamic state and will be for the 
foreseeable future. As American citizens, we need to accept that fact. 
Acceptance does not mean, however, that we should not speak out against 
violence and particularly violence against women and children. We need to 
use our influence, both as individuals and as a nation, to promote peace, 
which in turn should help improve economic conditions, which might 
provide more opportunities for all citizens. However, when violence against 
women or children occurs, we must focus the spotlight on it. 
C.  Does The United States Practice What it Preaches? 
Of the statements the professors made in their letter, the ones I found 
most troubling were the ones about the United States’ failure to practice 
what it preaches. It was hard for me to hear the statements suggesting the 
United States makes decisions based not on principles of democracy, but on 
the basis of religion and that, as individuals living in the southern and 
eastern parts of Afghanistan, the professors did not know who the terrorists 
were: the Taliban or the United States and NATO forces. It was also hard 
for me to read statements like the following one, from the International 
                                                                                                                              
193 World Report 2012: Saudi Arabia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-saudi-arabia (last visited June 
30, 2013). 
194 Gerald Butt, Saudi Arabia’s al-Qaeda Challenge, BBC News (Sept. 8, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19517476. 
195 John Rollins, Al Queda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and 
Implications for U.S. Policy, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Jan. 25, 2011), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/156542.pdf. 
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Crisis Group, an independent NGO funded by a variety of governments and 
non-governmental groups: 
Extrajudicial actions by the U.S. and its coalition partners against 
Afghan citizens have also distorted the justice system and are 
fuelling the insurgency. U.S. and NATO actions must conform to 
national and international laws, including an end to arbitrary 
detentions. There should be no expectation that Afghan officials 
and institutions will realign the justice system to conform to 
international norms until U.S. and NATO allies adjust their own 
policies and practices.196 
In the classes I taught on US criminal law, we discussed a number of 
principles, including constitutional provisions related to unlawful searches 
and seizures, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to counsel. At the time, 
the professors listened and asked questions but did not ask me about the 
United States’ practices in Afghanistan. It was not until they began drafting 
the letter that the professors talked to me about their belief that the United 
States did not itself practice the rule of law. 
In the discussion accompanying the letter’s drafting, the professors 
focused on two points. The first and most emotional topic was the practice 
of United States and NATO forces’ soldiers entering their homes at night. 
The second was the practice of arresting individuals and holding them 
indefinitely without the filing of charges or a trial. 
It is no secret that United States and NATO forces conduct night raids. 
What I did not fully understand until I talked with the professors is how 
these raids violate religious and cultural beliefs and practices. Even in fairly 
liberal families living in Kabul, a man who is not a close family member 
cannot enter a room in which there are Afghan women. For example, during 
evenings at an Afghanistan home, I could be in a room with both the men 
and women, but my male counterpart could not. He was required to stay in 
the garden with one of the sons while I socialized with men, women, and 
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children in the house. Having an American male enter a house in which 
there are women is deeply offensive.197 
Because such raids are so offensive, they quickly became a source of 
conflict between President Karzai and the United States, particularly once 
General Petraeus took control and increased the number of raids.198 While 
on April 8, 2012, Afghanistan and the United States signed a memorandum 
of understanding that specified that special operations, including night raids, 
had to be approved by Afghanistan and conducted according to Afghan 
law,199 there are reports that such raids continue.200 In March 2013, Afghans 
reported several night raids by US and NATO forces in which civilians 
were killed,201 prompting demonstrations and yet another warning from the 
National Ulema Council.202 
The second point the professors made involves allegations that the US 
detains Afghans without trial for indefinite periods. In response to such 
allegations, on March 9, 2012, the United States and Afghanistan signed an 
agreement that gives the United States the power to veto the transfer of 
some detainees, provided that the United States would transfer control of its 
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main detention facility in Bagram within six months.203 The transfer 
occurred on September 10, 2012.204 However, on November 18, 2012, 
President Karzai issued a statement in which he alleged US forces had 
captured and were holding Afghans in violation of the March pact.205 His 
statement was, apparently, based on a September 17, 2012, decision by an 
Afghani judicial panel ruling there was no basis in Afghan law for holding 
Afghan citizens without a trial.206 In response, the United States has argued 
it cannot risk the release of some high-value detainees to the notoriously 
corrupt Afghan court system.207 
At the time I worked with the professors, I knew about the agreement 
between the United States and Afghanistan relating to night raids, and about 
the agreement to transfer control of the detainee facility at Bagram to 
Afghans. I also knew that the “rules of war” are different from rules of law. 
Nonetheless, the conversation left me deeply troubled. As I write this, I 
continue to see myself in the dark of an Afghani home when NATO or 
United States troops come in with guns raised in the middle of the night. I 
also wonder why, during our classes on the US criminal system, the 
professors did not challenge me on the fact that a country that believes in 
the rule of law holds individuals indefinitely without trial. 
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As someone trained to make arguments, I can defend both sides of the 
issue. On the one hand, having been attacked, the United States had an 
interest in finding those who planned, financed, and committed that attack. 
When the Taliban refused the United States’ request to expel bin Laden, the 
United States had a “right” to go after him. Moreover, only three 
countries—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAR—recognized the Taliban 
as Afghanistan’s legitimate government.208 In attacking the Taliban, the 
United States was acting not only to protect its interests, but also to protect 
the interests of the Afghan people. Unfortunately, in military actions, it is 
not always possible to apply the rule of law. 
On the other hand, even if the initial attack was justified, the West should 
have withdrawn militarily once Afghanistan had an interim government, 
providing only economic assistance. In addition, the West should have led 
by example in providing that assistance, respecting the right of Afghans to 
choose their own form of government and practice their religion. 
What makes such arguments so hard is that I now know people on both 
sides. I know members of the United States military who have served 
multiple tours of duty in Afghanistan, at a high cost not only to themselves, 
but also to their families and friends. I also know Afghans whose family 
members have had their homes raided. While I would like to find someone 
to blame, at this point all I can do is apologize. I should have done what the 
professors urged and taken a more active role. 
D. Should the US Leave Afghanistan? 
Not all Afghans view the American presence in Afghanistan in the same 
way. Some welcomed the United States’ attack and are worried about what 
will happen when American soldiers leave.  Among those in this group are 
individuals who fled Afghanistan during the Taliban rule, seeking refuge in 
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Iran or Pakistan. Between 2002 and 2005, more than 2.5 million Afghans 
left Iran and Pakistan and returned to Afghanistan.209 Others criticize the 
United States both for the way in which it attacked Afghanistan and for its 
decision to stay in Afghanistan. First, they argue that punishing an entire 
country for Mullah Omar’s decision to allow Osama bin Laden to stay in 
Afghanistan was a disproportionate response. Second, they criticize the 
methods that the United States used in its attacks. Even though the United 
States did not keep “body counts,”210 those who have researched the issue 
estimate that between 1,000 and 1,300 Afghan civilians were killed between 
October 7, 2001, and January 1, 2002.211 
As a practical matter, it seems the longer that the United States is in 
Afghanistan, the more we are seen as “the enemy.” As one American 
official has stated, insider attacks by Afghan security forces on their 
Western allies became “the signature violence of 2012.”212 The increase in 
the number of insider attacks “has provided the clearest sign yet that 
Afghan resentment of foreigners is becoming unmanageable . . . “213 While 
the professors still welcome economic aid, in particular assistance in 
developing Afghanistan’s infrastructure, they want the military out. As they 




209 Afghan Returns from Pakistan Cross 2.5 Million Mark, UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (July 21, 2005), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?id=42dfb0f44. 
210 CRAWFORD, supra note 10, at 2. 
211 Daily Casualty Count of Afghan Civilians Killed by U.S. Bombing, PUBPAGES, 
http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/dossier (last visited June 30, 2013). 
212 Matthew Rosenberg, An Afghan Soldier’s Journey from Ally to Enemy of America, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/world/asia/afghan-
soldiers-journey-from-friend-to-killer-of-americans.html?hp&_r=0. 
213 Id. 
Greetings and Grievances 105 
VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 1 • 2013 
V. CONCLUSION 
I went to Afghanistan so that I could see at least a little of the country 
that so dominates the news. I want to thank the professors and staff who 
showed me their cities and invited me into their homes, and to the program 
administrators who arranged the trips to the Panjshir Valley, to a military 
base (Camp Phoenix), and to the United States Embassy in Kabul. 
Despite the adrenaline rush that such trips produce, now that I am home 
my thoughts keep going back to the letter, to the reports chronicling the 
killing of NATO and US troops and innocent Afghans, to the wars that the 
Afghan people have endured during the last thirty-five years, and to 
thoughts about what might happen to the people I have come to know once 
US and NATO forces leave. 
While I am deeply troubled by the fact that many Afghan women cannot 
leave their homes without a male relative and that, when they do, they must 
wear a chador214 and hijab215 or a burqua, I also spent time with families in 
which it was clear that husbands and wives and brothers and sisters loved 
and respected each other. While corruption has made a few Afghans rich, 
for most Afghans, even without war, Afghanistan is a hard place to live, 
both for men and for women. 
Thus, my predictions for the future of Afghanistan are bleak. First, it 
seems that history is repeating itself. As the professors told me 
“Afghanistan has always defeated those that have tried to control it.” After 
invading Afghanistan, both the British and the Russians had to negotiate 
“safe passage” out of the country. Our current situation may not be all that 
different. I also fear what happened after the Russians left will happen 
again. Following the Russian withdrawal, internal fighting continued for 
seven years, destroying much of Kabul and only ending when the Taliban 
took control. Given the sharp divisions among the various ethnic and tribal 
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groups, it seems unlikely that the elections scheduled for 2014 will result in 
a lasting coalition government. 
Second, as the US and NATO forces leave, so too will much of the 
money that fuels the Afghan economy. Moreover, if security worsens, 
NGOs are likely to leave and there will be less foreign aid and investment. 
In the short term, this decrease in funding means that things are likely to get 
much harder for the typical Afghan. While Afghanistan does have vast 
mineral deposits,216 I worry about the competition for those deposits from 
both the East and the West and that, because of corruption, the Afghan 
people will not benefit from the wealth taken from their lands. 
Third, many of Afghanistan’s well-educated and more liberal individuals 
are already leaving the country or making plans to leave.217 Depending on 
whom you ask, this departure is either good or bad. From a “western” 
perspective, it is bad: It makes it less likely that Afghanistan will develop 
economically, and it makes it less likely that the Afghan government will 
protect the rights of women and children. From the point of view of the 
many of the ulema, it is good in that it reduces challenges to true Islam. 
I hope that I am wrong. I also hope that I, and other law professors in the 
United States, will do what the Afghan professors have urged us to do, 
which is take a more active role in making suggestions that will help 
promote world peace. While I suspect that our suggestions will not always 
be those that the professors would want us to make, we can urge our 
government to develop a better understanding of Islamic law and the impact 
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of our government’s policies on those who do not share our core beliefs. I 
also hope that, even when it is hard, we practice what we preach. 
 
